Stephen Colbert

Strange times indeed. I woke up this morning to find several folks in my twitter stream alerting me to an interview on the “Colbert Report.” The interview was supposed to be about the GM wheat found recently in Oregon. Near the beginning of the interview, Colbert asks (humorously) how the GM wheat survived, wondering if it had been “doing a Rambo out there, living on mud puddles and grubs?”

Laurie Garrett immediately goes completely off-topic and responds:

Garrett: “The one thing we know, is that there are 24 strains of so-called superweeds. These are giant weeds that are very hard to kill, because they’ve absorbed these strange genes that make them resistant…”

 

Colbert:  ”In some wheat, there’s a gene in there that keeps Roundup from killing it, and that can jump to the weeds its trying to kill?”

 

Garrett:  ”Exactly.”

Exactly?? I don’t know what Laurie Garrett’s area of expertise is. Before this interview was brought to my attention on Twitter, I’d never heard of her. But she obviously knows very little about genetics, crop science, or weed management. This exchange is really quite baffling to me. Ms. Garrett apparently thinks that the 24 different “superweeds” (I presume she really means glyphosate-resistant weeds) have become glyphosate-resistant by “absorbing strange genes” from Roundup Ready wheat. The most troubling part, to me, is that she begins her statement with “The one thing we know…” and then proceeds to say something that is a complete fabrication.

Of the 24 weed species confirmed to be glyphosate-resistant, not a single one became resistant by hybridizing (or “absorbing” a gene, as Ms. Garrett describes it) from a crop. All glyphosate-resistant weeds found to date have evolved due to selection of naturally occurring resistant biotypes within a population by repeated use of the herbicide. Absolutely no crop transgenes have ever been found in a glyphosate-resistant weed. This could be possible in the future, particularly in the case of crops with closely related weed species (such as wheat and jointed goatgrass). But it has not happened to date.

Ms. Garrett then talks about the “Farmers Assurance Provision” and says that it:

“makes it impossible to sue genetically modified crop issues.”

I presume she is talking about the same paragraph that had been dubbed the “Monsanto Protection Act” by anti-GMO folks. The text of that provision is here:

Sec. 735. In the event that a determination of non-regulated status made pursuant to section 411 of the Plant Protection Act is or has been invalidated or vacated, the Secretary of Agriculture shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon request by a farmer, grower, farm operator, or producer, immediately grant temporary permit(s) or temporary deregulation in part, subject to necessary and appropriate conditions consistent with section 411(a) or 412(c) of the Plant Protection Act, which interim conditions shall authorize the movement, introduction, continued cultivation, commercialization and other specifically enumerated activities and requirements, including measures designed to mitigate or minimize potential adverse environmental effects, if any, relevant to the Secretary’s evaluation of the petition for non-regulated status, while ensuring that growers or other users are able to move, plant, cultivate, introduce into commerce and carry out other authorized activities in a timely manner: Provided, That all such conditions shall be applicable only for the interim period necessary for the Secretary to complete any required analyses or consultations related to the petition for non-regulated status: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the Secretary’s authority under section 411, 412 and 414 of the Plant Protection Act.

I don’t see anything in Section 735 that says anything about not being able to sue Monsanto. This paragraph gives absolutely no protection to Monsanto whatsoever with respect to GM wheat being found in Oregon. Perhaps Ms. Garrett was talking about a different provision put into a continuing resolution?

I realize that the Colbert Report is a comedy show, and that his shtick is to be over the top. I personally watch the show regularly and think it is quite funny. So it’s difficult to be too upset about this. But during the interview, Laurie Garrett makes two claims, both of which are completely untrue. Personally, I would be a little wary of going on ANY show, even a comedy show, and simply making things up. Particularly if I wanted to keep any sort of credibility as a Pulitzer Prize winning science journalist.

Here is the Colbert Report clip:

UPDATE: Monsanto’s response can be found here. In their statement, they seem to hold some doubt that the wheat found actually has Monsanto’s glyphosate resistant transgene. From the Monsanto statement:

The necessary testing requires sophisticated methods, considerable expertise and meticulous laboratory techniques to generate reliable results. Commercial test strips, which are used to detect the presence of glyphosate tolerance in soybeans, canola, cotton and sugar beets, generate a very high incidence of false positive detections (greater than 90 percent) and are not reliable for wheat. We have asked for information necessary to confirm the presence of the Roundup Ready trait in the samples that were tested.  Up to this point, Monsanto has not received details about the testing USDA has performed, nor has UDSA provided us with samples necessary to verify their findings

I’ve heard the information about false positives from using test strips for other crops before, so if this is indeed the method used to “confirm” the presence of the gene, then I would reserve judgement until the results are confirmed using other methods.

UPDATE 2: I’ve just learned that the wheat plant(s) in question were tested by 2 independent laboratories within Oregon State University for the presence of the glyphosate resistance transgene using a variety of molecular methods. APHIS was notified shortly after these tests confirmed the presence of the transgene, which led APHIS to begin their own investigation. So it seems that there is little doubt that the glyphosate resistant wheat in Oregon has the glyphosate-resistant transgene, and did not evolve glyphosate-resistance independently. The main question now, is how did it get there?

UPDATE 3: The Biofortified blog has a great collection of information about this story that will be updated as more information is known The Biofortified post has been removed for some reason…

“The question in this case is whether a farmer who buys patented seeds may reproduce them  through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission. We hold that he may not.”

A fairly clear decision. The nuts and bolts of their reasoning:

“Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman could resell the patented soybeans he  purchased from the grain elevator; so too he could consume the beans himself or feed them to his animals. Monsanto, although the patent holder, would have no business interfering in those uses of Roundup Ready beans. But the exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission (either express or implied). And that is precisely what Bowman did. He took the soybeans he purchased home; planted them in his fields at the time he thought best; applied glyphosate to kill weeds (as well as any soy plants lacking the Roundup Ready trait); and finally harvested more (many more) beans than he started with. That is how “to ‘make’ a new product,” to use Bowman’s words, when the original product is a seed.”

“Because Bowman thus reproduced Monsanto’s patented invention, the exhaustion doctrine does not protect him.”

And they were careful to limit their decision today from being expanded to other types of self-replicating technologies:

“Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product. We recognize that such inventions are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another case, the article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose.”

Also, have a read through NPR’s coverage of the decision.

“it can be hard to see where scientific evidence ends and dogma and speculation begin.”

 

“Researchers, farmers, activists and GM seed companies all stridently promote their views, but the scientific data are often inconclusive or contradictory. Complicated truths have long been obscured by the fierce rhetoric.”

I agree wholeheartedly. Especially when browsing the internet, there is a lot of misinformation, half-truths, and outright lies about GM crops. I’m always glad to see this topic approached with scientific rigor, and I expected an outlet like Nature to do just that. The point of Ms. Gilbert’s article was to separate fact from fiction with respect to some often heard claims about genetically modified (GM) crops. One of the three issues Ms. Gilbert chose to tackle in her article is the claim that “GM crops have bred superweeds,” and she considers this statement “True.”

I was a little disappointed to see the term “superweeds” in any type of scientific publication. I have repeatedly expressed my displeasure with this term, and my graduate students know better than to ever use the word around me. To see it in a publication as reputable as Nature is exceptionally frustrating. But at least this article would be approached with some “scientific evidence” rather than “dogma and speculation”, right? But as I read through the section on superweeds, I saw very little that resembled scientific evidence; rather, lots of opinions, anecdotes, interesting tidbits, some facts and figures, and a fairly compelling narrative. But no “scientific evidence.”

The lack of any scientific evidence in the article probably relates to my biggest beef with the term superweed: nobody seems to know what the hell a superweed is. To determine whether “GM crops have bred superweeds” at least two things are needed:

1. a definition of the term superweed, and
2. data that relate use of GM crops to development of superweeds.

Let’s begin by trying to define superweed. Certainly, the term indicates that the weed is super in some way; it must possess some trait that is above and beyond an ordinary weed. Like a superhero that has some ability that the general public does not. So what is this “super” trait that superweeds possess? Can a superweed grow faster than the Incredible Hulk? Or can a superweed spin a web like the Amazing Spiderman? Or maybe a superweed can fly like Superman!

Most of the time, the term superweed is associated in some way with herbicide resistance. So if we define superweed as a weed that has evolved resistance to herbicides, we can then test the hypothesis that “GM crops have bred superweeds.” (ASIDE: The way this statement is phrased, there’s no way it can possibly be true, because crops don’t “breed” weeds. There are some rare cases where crops and weeds cross pollinate, but those have not resulted in any herbicide resistant weeds to date. For the sake of argument, we’ll assume Ms. Gilbert really meant “GM crops have significantly increased the development of superweeds.”) Dr. Ian Heap has developed and maintained a website to document new cases of herbicide resistant weeds, and we can use the data at that site to get an idea of whether this statement is true or false using our definition of superweed.

If GM crops have contributed significantly to the development of herbicide resistant weeds, we would expect the number of unique instances of these superweeds to increase following adoption of GM crops. The figure below illustrates all unique cases of herbicide resistant weeds between 1986 and 2012. I have fit a linear regression to the data from 1986 to 1996 (time period before widespread GM crop adoption) and another regression to the time period 1997 to 2012.

The slope of the linear regression is an estimate of the number of new herbicide resistant weeds documented each year. In the eleven year period before GM crops were widely grown, approximately 13 new cases of herbicide resistance were documented annually. After GM crop adoption began in earnest, the number of new herbicide resistant weeds DECREASED to 11.4 cases per year. The difference in slopes between these two time periods is probably not very meaningful from a practical standpoint. But based on the best data available, we can be quite certain that adoption of GM crops has NOT caused an increase in development of superweeds compared to other uses of herbicides.

Perhaps this definition of superweed is too broad. Let’s define it instead as only “glyphosate-resistant” weeds. The first glyphosate-resistant weed was documented in 1996. This is approximately the same time GM crops were first being introduced into the market. But this first superweed evolved in Australia, where no GM crops were grown. So it is obvious that GM crops are not necessary for glyphosate-resistant superweeds to develop. Certainly, adoption of Roundup Ready crops (the dominant GM herbicide resistance trait) has increased the use of glyphosate in cropland, and therefore increased selection pressure for glyphosate-resistant weed populations. But even so, there are currently more instances of glyphosate-resistant weeds in non-GM crops/sites than in GM crops. The following chart (from www.weedscience.org) illustrates the number of cases of glyphosate-resistant weed species in various crops/sites.

The only 3 GM crops on the chart are soybean, corn, and cotton. All of the other bars represent non-GM systems. If we add up the number of herbicide resistant species in GM crops and compare it to non-GM crops/sites, we should expect GM crops to have a higher number if GM crops are the primary contributor to evolution of superweeds. However:

• 35 species of glyphosate-resistant weeds are present in GM crops (soybean, corn, cotton).
• 40 species of glyphosate-resistant weeds are present in non-GM crops/sites (orchards, grapes, roadsides, wheat, fencelines, fruit, barley).

So again, there appears to be no strong difference between GM crops and other sites where glyphosate is used. So this data again suggest that GM crops are not any more problematic than other uses of glyphosate for selection of superweeds.

One deficiency in the above graph is that it doesn’t indicate where the weeds first evolved. Perhaps they evolved in GM crops, but then moved to infest other sites represented in the bar chart above. So instead, let’s take a look at WHERE the glyphosate-resistant weed species FIRST EVOLVED. Of the 24 glyphosate-resistant species documented worldwide, 11 of these superweeds first evolved in GM crops; compared to 13 superweeds that have evolved in non-GM crops/sites. Read those numbers again. And check out the figure below, looking at where and when glyphosate-resistant superweeds first evolved.

Almost any way you look at the data, it appears that GM crops are no greater contributor to the evolution of superweeds than other uses of herbicides. Which makes sense, because GM crops don’t select for herbicide resistant weeds; herbicides do. Herbicide resistant weed development is not a GMO problem, it is a herbicide problem.

It is important to note that the glyphosate-resistant weed species that have had the most economic impact are those that evolved first in GM crops (in particular, the Palmer amaranth noted in Ms. Gilbert’s article). But this is primarily because it is these weed species that were the most economically damaging to begin with (before they acquired their super-powers). But the Palmer amaranth narrative is what leads many people to conclude that glyphosate-resistant weeds are primarily a problem in GM crops. Certainly, Roundup Ready crops have increased the amount of glyphosate used in cropland, and this increased glyphosate use has contributed to the evolution of some new glyphosate-resistant weeds. No one can dispute that. But glyphosate-resistant weeds evolved due to glyphosate use, not directly due to GM crops. And to date, there have been more new cases of glyphosate-resistant superweeds documented in non-GM crops/sites than in GM crops. So it is difficult to make the case that GM crops are any more problematic than other uses of herbicides with respect to superweed development. Unless, of course, you rely on dogma and speculation.

Now, can we PLEASE stop using the term superweed?

Winter wheat at SAREC, near Lingle, WY

The good news is that we’ve recently gotten a lot of snow across the region. However, even with the significant precipitation, most of Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado are still in Severe or Extreme drought. I doubt the recent moisture will be enough to salvage any yield from this site, but perhaps some of the wheat that was in “Poor” or “Fair” condition will be able to use the recent precipitation to make a crop.

At a recent meeting in Powell, I was asked how to best use ethofumesate (active ingredient in Nortron SC and other herbicides) in fields that must be furrow irrigated for sugarbeet emergence. This is a difficult question. Ethofumesate (and almost all soil applied herbicides) require soil moisture to be effective. Ideally, residual herbicides should be applied to the soil shortly before either rainfall or overhead irrigation. Growers who have sprinkler systems in their field can apply 0.5-inches of irrigation water after ethofumesate application, and this will be enough to activate the herbicide.

Furrow irrigated fields in the Big Horn Basin of Wyoming present a problem for soil-applied herbicide incorporation. The primary issue is that we simply do not receive enough precipitation in the spring to allow crops to germinate and emerge without irrigation. This is different from many other growing regions, even those where irrigation is required. For example, in the southeast part of the state (Goshen County), irrigation is required for sugarbeet production, but spring rains are regular enough that it is uncommon to irrigate for emergence. Rainfall is not something we can depend on in the Big Horn Basin of Wyoming; average precipitation (rain and snow combined) is less than 6 inches annually in Powell.

Because of the limited precipitation, sugarbeet growers in the Big Horn Basin create beds (usually in the spring), then plant the crop on the top of the beds. The bedding operation creates the furrows that are required to irrigate the field to stimulate germination and emergence. Although the ideal situation would be to make the beds, apply the herbicide, and pray for rain, most prayers for rain go unanswered in Powell. So the question is: when (and how) do we apply the preemergence herbicide in relation to bedding and planting.

In 2004 through 2006, Dr. Abdel Mesbah and Dr. Steve Miller conducted research to answer this very question. They applied Nortron (either as a standard liquid spray, or impregnated on dry fertilizer) at two rates: 1.25 lbs or 2.5 lbs of ethofumesate ai per acre. These are both relatively high rates for our region; 1.25 pounds of ethofumesate ai is equivalent to 40 fluid ounces of Nortron per acre. Nortron rates of 24 to 32 fluid ounces per acre are more common. The reason they used higher rates in the study was to ensure that they would be able to observe any injury that may be caused by the application methods and bedding procedures. After applying Nortron, they incorporated the herbicide into the soil with a roller harrow, and then created the beds. They used two implements for the bedding operation; either with “large” or “small” soil movement.

Bedding operation with “small” soil movement.

Bedding operation with “large” soil movement.

The reasoning behind this is that if we move a large amount of soil during the bedding operation, there is potential to have very high concentrations on top of the beds (where the soil is being moved to) and a low concentration in the furrows (where the soil is being moved from). This could potentially result in poor weed control in the furrows, and greater potential for sugarbeet injury on the beds. After the bedding operations, sugarbeet were planted, stands were counted, injury was evaluated, and the studies were harvested at the end of the year to evaluate yield.

No sugarbeet stand loss was observed in any treatment in any year of the study. Injury symptoms were minor in 2004 and 2006, especially at the 1.25 lbs ai/A rate; however, ethofumesate injury was substantial in 2005. Liquid applications of ethofumesate caused more injury compared with dry applications on impregnated fertilizer. The amount of soil movement did not have a major impact on the amount of injury observed.

Sugarbeet yield followed a similar pattern as visual injury evaluations. If ethofumesate was applied as a dry impregnated fertilizer treatment, sugarbeet yields were similar or greater than the check (no ethofumesate) in all 3 years. Liquid applications of ethofumesate caused a reduction in yield regardless of rate. The amount of soil movement had no observable impact on sugarbeet yield.

This research indicates that the amount of soil movement during the bedding operation is not a major contributor to sugarbeet injury from ethofumesate. Ethofumesate rate and formulation type will influence the amount of injury observed. Ethofumesate applied on impregnated fertilizer increased the safety compared with liquid applications. If applying ethofumesate in sugarbeet before the bedding operation, impregnated fertilizer is the safest method. Reducing the ethofumesate application rate can also increase safety to the sugarbeet crop. Ethofumesate rates of 0.75 to 1.0 lbs ai/A (24 to 32 fluid ounces of Nortron), mechanically incorporated into the soil, then bedded should provide acceptable control of early season weeds while minimizing risk of injury to the sugarbeet crop.

For best results:

• Apply ethofumesate as either a liquid spray or as a dry formulation:
  • If applying ethofumesate as a liquid spray, apply 24 to 32 fluid ounces per acre, and mechanically incorporate.
  • If applying dry fertilizer impregnated with ethofumesate, apply 32 fluid ounces per acre and mechanically incorporate.
• Use a roller-harrow or other implement to incorporate the ethofumesate uniformly to a 2-inch depth.
• Create beds, and plant.
• During the first irrigation, be sure the soil is wetted all the way up to the sugarbeet row to ensure uniform efficacy.

It is still possible, even when using these best practices, that certain environmental conditions could cause sugarbeet injury. Heavy precipitation (rain or snow) shortly after planting presents the greatest risk. However, the recommendations above will provide early-season weed control while minimizing the potential for crop injury.

To download a free PDF version of the field guide or to order your own hard copy, please click HERE.

We’re also going to be doing some tweeting from the meeting. If you’re on Twitter, check out the #WSWSmtg hashtag to see what’s going on, and be sure to follow Brian (@ControlFreaksWY) and Andrew (@WyoWeeds).

Every now and then I get a quiet weekend afternoon to take some time for myself. I sometimes take advantage of it by enjoying a book in the shade, walking the river trying to find a trout on the rise or some other creative form of ‘doing nothing.’ Sometimes I am able to temporarily forget about the ‘to do list’ for work and home, and it can be quite rejuvenating. At other times, my peace of mind is constantly bombarded by the realization that my R & R will lead only to an increased workload once it is over.

 When making decisions for business or personal reasons one must ensure that benefits exceed the costs, particularly in today’s economic climate, but actions that seem to produce temporary savings today may lead to increased costs in the future. If left unmanaged for even several years, invasive weeds are capable of expanding rapidly, with exponential increase in the negative impacts (such as reductions in livestock forage, crop production or wildlife habitat) felt by the landowner or manager. The decision to implement a weed management program should be evaluated within the context of the particular situation, whether it is a smaller acreage property, a ranch agribusiness or a multi-thousand acre federal grazing allotment. Here we explore the potential impacts of deciding not to actively implement a weed control program or to discontinue an existing program on your property…making the decision to do nothing.

 Invasive weeds are capable of rapid spread from existing populations. Although expansion rates vary among weed species and due to site-specific conditions, we can make some assumptions based on published literature. Small, newly established populations have been documented to expand at rates of up to 60% per year. As infestation become large, rates of expansion may decrease for several reasons, but driven largely by resource limitations. One study indicates an expansion rate of 24% per year over a twenty year period averaged across 14 weed species in the Western U.S. Larger infestations lead to larger losses in usable forage for livestock or wildlife. As an example, a 100 acre leafy spurge infestation in rangelands that normally produce 0.3 AUMs per acre can result in an annual forage loss of 30 AUMs (assuming no forage use from infested acres). Over a 10 year period, you will have lost at least 300 AUMs worth of forage; with the assumption that the infestation did not increase in size. Private grazing leases may be up to $20 per AUM, so this particular leafy spurge infestation may cost a rancher up to $6000 over a 10 year period…not to mention the cost of hay to replace lost forage.

 As individual infestation size increases, the cost of control increases while the probability of eradication decreases. Larger infestations will cost more to control, by default, because more labor and control materials are needed to cover the larger area. Other, less obvious factors also increase potential costs of management. As weeds persist longer in an area and become more dense, the likelihood of controlling the population with a single method decreases: integrated methods including seeding of desirable species may be required. A publication from the University of Nevada discusses the change in costs associated with delaying control on a 75 acre infestation of perennial pepperweed with an expansion rate of 20%, but similar patterns would hold up for other weeds as well. Initial project costs were estimated at $12,647. If the project startup was delayed for only 4 years, those costs were estimated to increase to over $26,000 and to over $54,000 after an 8 year delay in initiating control. If a 30% expansion rate was assumed, a 10-year delay in starting control resulted in a first-year control cost of over $170,000. A California study examined 53 separate weed infestations including 18 different species that were targeted for eradication (complete removal of the weed). Only those infestations less than one acre had a high percentage of successful eradication. Infestations above 100 acres had 25% or less success in eradicating the weed, with labor-hour investments in the tens of thousands. Once a weed infestation passes beyond a few acres, the financial commitment to maintaining the productivity of the infested acres is for the long-term. This not only applies to new infestations, but to those where abandonment of past control efforts have resulted in new expansion of existing infestations.

 We are fortunate in Wyoming to have active Weed and Pest Districts that are willing to aid landowners in their weed management efforts. The districts provide cost-sharing opportunities to purchase herbicides for controlling state-listed noxious weeds; further helping to decrease the financial burdens on landowners. So as you make plans for you to-do list this spring and summer, take some time to consider the long-term perspective. An “ounce of prevention” may be far more affordable than the cost of doing nothing.